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Abstract—A set of economic entities embedded in a network
graph collaborate by opportunistically exchanging their resources
to satisfy their dynamically generated needs. Under what condi-
tions their collaboration leads to a sustainable economy? Which
online policy can ensure a feasible resource exchange point will
be attained, and what information is needed to implement it?
Furthermore, assuming there are different resources and the
entities have diverse production capabilities, which production
policy each entity should employ in order to maximize the econ-
omy’s sustainability? Importantly, can we design such policies
that are also incentive compatible even when there is no a priori
information about the entities’ needs? We introduce a dynamic
production scheduling and resource exchange model to capture
this fundamental problem and provide answers to the above
questions. Applications range from infrastructure sharing, trade
and organization management, to social networks and sharing
economy services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic entities (EE), being individuals, organizations or
countries, need resources (natural resources, services, etc.) in
order to sustain their existence and normal activity. Their needs
are expressed in terms of requests of a certain amount of a
given resource (demands) that are generated at time instances
and that should be satisfied either by immediate provisioning
of the resource if there is in stock with the entity, or provi-
sioning when will become available to the entity in the near
future. Each economic entity has the capability of generating
resources either because it is endowed (natural resources) or
because of production planning and specialization. Hence each
EE generates resources, certain quantities of which become
available at certain instances and they either satisfy a pending
resource request if there is one.
An economic entity is self sustainable if she can satisfy her
own needs for resources in the long run in the sense that for
each resource type the rate with which resource is produced
exceeds the rate with which resource requests are generated.
If resource requests are generated faster than the production
rate capability of that resource then there is a shortage of
the resource for the entity; this may undermine the long term
sustainability of the entity. If we have a collection of EE
that are capable of exchanging resources, it is possible that
although some of them are not sustainable by their own, they
may engage in a resource exchange scheme where an entity
covers her own shortage in a resource by the excess production
of another EE. When there is an exchange scheme such that
all EE become sustainable then the resulting economy is
sustainable.
In the first part of this paper we consider an economy of
EE specified by an exchange graph the topology of which
indicates which EE may exchange resource with which other
EE, and the rates of resource demands and production of
each EE. We specify the conditions for sustainability of such
an exchange economy, and we provide a dynamic exchange
scheme where each EE determines how to allocate her excess
resources to her neighbors such that each EE satisfies her
needs if the exchange economy is sustainable. Interestingly
enough, no central coordination is necessary and it is adequate
if each EE just observes the pending resource requests of her
neighbors and allocates the excess resource to the neediest
neighbor (including her own needs).
In the second part of the paper we consider the case
where each EE may do some planning of her production
capabilities. It is her choice to increase the production of a
certain resource by committing more effort to that purpose to
the expense of reducing the production of another resource
from the production of which the effort is reallocated. The
production choices of an EE are reflected to the production
rates of the different resources by the EE. We assume that
a production plan is represented by the vector of resource
production rates of the different resources under that plan.
The possible production plan choices are represented by the
set of different production rate vectors that are feasible by the
EE. It is reasonable to assume that each EE attempts to find
a plan that covers her demands, yet this might not be feasible
for all entities.
Therefore, assuming an exchange economy among the EE
we consider the question: is there a choice of production
plan for each EE such that the production vectors result in
a sustainable economy? We provide conditions under which
that is feasible, and then we introduce a dynamic scheme for
each entity determining her production plan that when operates
on top of the exchange policy described earlier we result in
a sustainable economy. The production planning may operate
in a different (slower) time scale than the exchange scheme
and again it is dynamic and agnostic on the global economy
picture as it does not require knowledge of the EE capabilities
in terms of feasible production rates. Each EE reconfigures her
production plan at each time in an attempt to satisfy her own
needs and that of her exchange peer EE in the best possible
ways based on the declared unsatisfied demands of the past.
That dynamic policy has as a result global sustainability.
Finally, we extend this analysis to the important case the
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production induces significant costs. The cooperation and ex-
change of resources among the EEs can result in a sustainable
economy and also reduce the aggregate induced costs com-
pared to the scenario where each EE operates independently.
The question that inevitably arises is under what conditions
the entities will cooperate, and in particular how they will
agree to split the cost-reduction benefits emerging from their
collaboration. Leveraging the Nash bargaining solution, we
describe the general properties of such incentive-compatible
(IC) cooperative solutions. Moreover, we develop dynamic
policies that ensure the sustainable operation of the exchange
economy while satisfying the IC criterion. Our solution is
agnostic on the actual needs and production rates of the EEs,
and ensures their fair (and hence self-enforcing) collaboration
even without knowing a priori the benefits of their synergy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce the dynamic exchange model employed to study
these cooperative systems and present a simple distributed al-
gorithm that stabilizes the economy whenever this is possible.
Section III focuses on the richer model with different types
of resources and introduces a dynamic production schedul-
ing policy, amenable to distributed execution, that provably
stabilizes the economy. In Section IV we present a model
where the different production plans induce different costs, and
devise an incentive-compatible policy that ensures the system’s
sustainable operation. Finally, Section V provides a discussion
about related works and concludes our study.
II. COMMODITY SHARING
We consider a set N of N = |N | economic entities
(EE) who produce a set K of K = |K| types of resources
(or, commodities) over time. The entities are embedded in
a directed connected graph G = (N , E), where the set
E of edges denotes the possible exchanges which are not
necessarily bidirectional. Each EE has two roles, acting both
as a consumer and as a producer of resources. Therefore there
are i = 1, 2, . . . , N consumers and j = 1, 2, . . . , N producers
in the system. We denote with Ni the set of j = 1, . . . , Ni
producers who can serve consumer i; and with Nj the set
of i = 1, . . . , Nj consumers who can receive resources from
producer j. The connectivity among consumers and producers
is determined by E . Note that (i, i) ∈ E , ∀i ∈ N , as each EE
can serve her own requests. We first study the setting with one
commodity.
We assume that resources are produced and allocated in
batches, hence we consider a time slotted operation. During
each slot t, a number of Ai(t) ≥ 0 resource requests are
generated at consumer i ∈ N . Let Xi(t) be the number of
demands, i.e., pending requests, at the ith consumer by the
end of slot t. In the beginning of each slot t, Bj(t) units of
resource are generated at producer j. We define the vector
B(t) = (Bj(t), j ∈ N ). The processes Ai, Bj , i, j ∈ N , are
independent and i.i.d. over time, with constant and determin-
istically bounded expectations E[Ai(t)] = ai ≤ Amax, and
E[Bj(t)] = bj ≤ Bmax. An example is shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. An instance of a cooperative economy with 3 entities and
the respective dynamic exchange model with 3 consumers and 3
producers. Each entity can serve its own demands, and the demands
of its neighbors. The graph is directed.
The control action in this system is to decide how the
resources of the producers will be allocated to the consumers
at each slot t. Let Iji(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether producer j
is servicing the demand of consumer i ∈ Nj during slot t, by
allocating to i all its available resources. The control matrix
is then:
I(t) =
(
Iji(t) ∈ {0, 1} : (j, i) ∈ E
)
(1)
for modeling purposes, we assume that I is a N ×N binary
matrix, where the entry (j, i) can be equal to 1 only if (j, i) ∈
E . Without loss of generality, we assume that each consumer
can be served by many producers, but each producer can serve
at most one consumer or idle. Hence, the set of eligible control
matrices is
I = {I : Iji ≥ 0,
∑
i∈Nj
Iji ≤ 1, ∀ i, j ∈ N}. (2)
Let Mi(t) denote the aggregate resource that consumer i
receives in slot t:
Mi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
Iji(t)Bj(t) . (3)
Then, the number of its pending requests evolves as
Xi(t) = [Xi(t− 1)−Mi(t)]+ +Ai(t) , (4)
and we define X(t) = (Xi(t), i ∈ N ).
The economic sustainability can be defined using the strong
stability requirement for the demands [1]:
lim
t→∞ sup
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
N∑
i=1
E [Xi(τ)] <∞ , (5)
or, in other words, we ask that the M.C. X = {X(t)}t=∞t=1 is
ergodic and possesses a stationary distribution. It can be easily
shown that the necessary conditions for sustainability of this
economy are: ∑
i∈Q
ai ≤
∑
j∈NQ
bj , ∀Q ⊆ N , (6)
where NQ is the set of producers that can serve one or
more consumers in set Q. These conditions characterize the
sustainability region Λ of the cooperative economy, i.e., the
closure of set of demand generation rates a = (ai : i ∈ N )
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Fig. 2. (a): An example of a cooperative economy with EE; it is
with b1 = E[B1(t)] = 2, b2 = E[B2(t)] = 3. (b): Sustainable
demand region of the economy when the nodes do not collaborate
(green area) and when the nodes do cooperate (red area).
that can be supported by the N entities if they collaborate.
We refer to such a cooperative economy as sustainable.
The following Lemma explains that (6) is sufficient in the
sense that it guarantees the existence of a random and state-
independent servicing policy Πopt that allocates with a certain
probability the resources of each producer to every consumer
she is connected to.
Lemma 1: For any demand generation vector a ∈ Λ, there
exists a stationary allocation policy Πopt that renders the
economy sustainable. Moreover, this policy can be found in
polynomial time.
The allocation probabilities can be also interpreted as time
shares of service each consumer receives from her neighbors.
The next question is whether there exists a dynamic ex-
change policy that ensures sustainability whenever that is pos-
sible. Namely, we are interested in policies that are amenable
to distributed implementation and achieve this goal without
any prior knowledge about the request and resource generation
rates ai, bj , i, j ∈ N , nor the graph G.
The following theorem describes a policy that satisfies the
above requirements and ensures the sustainable operation of
the economy whenever a ∈ Λ:
Theorem 1: The max-weight policy [5], that selects in each
slot t the control action I(t) ∈ I such that:
I∗(t) = arg max
I∈I
N∑
i=1
Xi(t)
∑
j∈Ni
IjiBj(t) (7)
stabilizes the system if a ∈ Λ and yields average backlog:
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
N∑
i=1
E[Xi(τ)] ≤ NA
2
max +
∑N
i=1 d
in
i B
2
max
2(a)
where (a) is the distance of a from the boundary of Λ, and
dini the in-degree of EE i in G.
Due to the design assumption that a consumer can be served
by more than one producer the optimal I∗(t) can be found
in a distributed fashion as shown in Algorithm 1, where
every producer simply allocates its resource to the connected
consumer with the largest demand.
An example of two cooperating EE and the benefits that
emanate from their collaboration is depicted in Figure 2.
Algorithm 1: Max-weight Servicing Policy
1 t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}; % Time-slotted algorithm.
2 % Each producer serves her downstream consumers:
3 for j = 1 : N do
4 Find i∗ = argmaxi∈Nj Xi(t).
5 Set Iji∗(t) = 1.
end
6 % Each consumer informs her neighbors for her
demands:
7 for i = 1 : N do
8 Xi(t) = [Xi(t− 1)−Mi(t)]+ +Ai(t).
9 Send Xi(t) to every j ∈ Ni.
end
We observe that cooperation does not increase the maximum
aggregate request rate of the EE yet the set of supportable
rates expands significantly due to the flexibility of re-routing
the requests among the entities.
III. PRODUCTION SCHEDULING
We now focus on the case with K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} dif-
ferent commodities. Each economic entity i generates Aik(t)
requests for commodity k during slot t, where the processes
Aik, i ∈ N , k ∈ K are i.i.d. and independent, with
E[Aik(t)] = aik ≤ Amax. Each EE j ∈ N has a certain
set of feasible production plans Pj . Under each plan p ∈ Pj
the EE produces Bpjk(t) = B
p
jk ≤ Bmax units of commodity
k ∈ K in each slot t. Although we consider deterministic
production, our results can be directly extended for stochastic
production where, for example, the schedule selects only the
mean values. Finally, we assume that each entity can update
her production plan every time period t = nT with T >> 1.
This reflects practical system constraints where production
scheduling cannot follow the dynamics of request generation
and resource allocation.
The control policies of this economy include both the
service allocation and the production planning. We define
Zjp(nT ) ∈ {0, 1} as the decision of EE j to select plan p ∈ Pj
during period nT . This yields the production vector:
Bpj = (B
p
j1, B
p
j2, . . . , B
p
jK) . (8)
We denote with Z the production vector of all EEs, and define
the set of all feasible plans:
Z = {Z : Zjp ∈ {0, 1},
∑
p∈Pj
Zjp ≤ 1, j ∈ N } . (9)
It is assumed that each producer can satisfy only the de-
mands of one consumer (including itself) for each commodity,
but can concurrently serve more than one other consumers for
different commodities. Therefore, the set of all feasible control
policies is
IK =
(
IK : Ikji ∈ {0, 1},
∑
i∈Nj
Ikji ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ N , k ∈ K
)
.
12
A11(t)
A21(t)
B11(t)
B21(t)
Capacity region of  
independent queues
Capacity region of  
cooperating queues
1
2
A12(t)
A22(t)
B12(t)
B22(t)
1
2
Commodity  k=1
Commodity  k=2
b11
b21
b12b22
b21+b21
b22+b12
 k=1
 k=2
Z1p
Z2p
(a)
1
2
A11(t)
A21(t)
B11(t)
B21(t)
Sustainable region of  
independent EE
Sustainable region of  
cooperating EE
1
2
A12(t)
A22(t)
B12(t)
B22(t)
1
2
Commodity  k=1
Commodity  k=2
b11
b21
b12b22
b21+b11
b22+b12
 k=1
 k=2
Z1p
Z2p
(b)
Fig. 3. (a): Example of K = 2 commodities for system in Fig.
2(a). The eligible plans for EE j = 2 are p1 = (b21, b22 = 0),
p2 = (b21 = 0, b22) and similarly for j = 1. (b): The sustainable
demand region ΛPK of the system when EEs cooperate and when they
operate independently. Each axis represents the total served amount
for each commodity in both EE.
Under the above assumptions, the amount of resource k that
consumer i receives during slot t is:
Mik(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
Ikji(t)
∑
p∈Pj
Zjp(tT )B
p
jk(t), (10)
where tT =
⌊
t
T
⌋
is the last time before slot t that the produc-
tion schedule was updated. We denote MK(t) = (Mik(t) :
i ∈ I, k ∈ K) the I × K matrix of services in slot t which
depends on the planning and allocation decisions Z and IK
in that slot.
The unsatisfied demands at each consumer for every com-
modity evolve in time as follows:
Xik(t) = [Xik(t− 1)−Mik(t)]+ +Aik(t) . (11)
We can therefore define the sustainability region [1]:
ΛPK ={aK = (aik : i ∈ N , k ∈ K) :
aK ∈ Co{MK(IK,Z) | I ∈ IK,Z ∈ Z}} ,
where Co(·) is the convex hull operator. The following lemma
holds.
Lemma 2: For any demand generation matrix aK ∈ ΛPK,
there exists a stationary randomized control policy ΠKopt that
chooses Z every T slots, and IK every slot t, and stabilizes
the economy.
Next, we design a dynamic policy that determines the plan
and the service allocation, and stabilizes the system whenever
a ∈ ΛPK. This is non-trivial since it involves decisions in
different time-scales. Algorithm 2 describes the policy. The
main idea is that in every time period, each producer finds for
each of her neighboring consumers the commodity with the
largest pending requests (line 5), and then uses these to select
the plan that will serve better the neediest consumers (line 6).
Then, in every time slot, the producers allocate their resources
to the largest backlog of demands (lines 10-12). Note that the
algorithm can be executed in a distributed (but synchronous)
fashion. The following theorem states its performance.
Theorem 2: Suppose an economy has a sustainability region
ΛPK and demand aK such that aK+ 1 ∈ ΛPK; then under the
policy described in Algorithm 2 and a set value for V , the
Algorithm 2: Production and Service Allocation Policy
1 t = nT, n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}; % Time periods.
2 % Each producer selects her production plan:
3 for j = 1 : N do
4 % Find highest commodity k∗ demand ∀i ∈ Nj .
5 Set Xˆik∗(t) = Xik∗(t); else Xˆik(t) = 0
6 Find p∗ = argmaxp∈Pj
∑
i∈Nj
∑
k∈K Xˆik∗(t)B
p
jk.
end
7 % Each producer allocates her resources in each slot τ :
8 for τ = t : t+ T − 1 do
9 for j = 1 : N do
10 for k = 1 : K do
11 Find i∗ = argmaxi∈Nj Xik(τ)B
p∗
jk .
12 Set Ikji∗(τ) = 1.
end
end
13 % Each consumer updates its pending demands:
14 for i = 1 : N do
15 for k = 1 : K do
16 Xik(τ) = [Xik(τ − 1)−Mik(τ)]+ +Aik(τ).
17 Send Xik(τ) to every j ∈ Ni.
end
end
end
economy is sustainable and the average backlog of unsatisfied
demands is bounded:
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
∑
i,k
E[Xik(τ)] ≤
NKA2max +
∑
i,k
∑
j∈Ni
(
Bp∗jk
)2
/T
where Bp
∗
jk is the max production rate of j for commodity k.
The backlog of unsatisfied demands increases with T and K;
and depends on the exchange graph as it includes the in-degree
of nodes.
IV. COSTLY PRODUCTION SCHEDULES
We now extend our analysis to the case of costly production
plans. Clearly, when production of resources induces signifi-
cant costs, then it is not ensured that demand rates within the
sustainability region of the system will be served (as in the
previous section). Namely, when self-interested EEs cooperate
it is expected that each one of them will attempt to satisfy
her demands through this collaboration (e.g., by receiving
resources from others) while at the same time minimizing her
own production cost (e.g., selecting low-cost plans). It is well
known that such free-riding behaviors may lead to tragedy of
commons phenomena, where the cooperation benefits diminish
rapidly.
To address this issue, we introduce an additional design
criterion for our cooperation policy, namely that of being
incentive-compatible (IC) and hence implementable by the
self-interested EEs. However, it is well-known that such game
theoretic-based policies require the a priori knowledge of the
demand rates and the cooperation benefits, information which
in many practical settings is not available. We present here
a production and service exchange algorithm that ensures
the sustainable and incentive compatible operation of the
economy, whenever that is possible, without relying on prior
information about demands (or, production rates).
In detail, we assume that when an EE j ∈ N selects plan
p ∈ Pj , she incurs cost of cjp units for that period. Therefore,
when j operates independently, her optimal production policy
can be found by solving the optimization problem (Optindj ):
min
{ζjp}
∑
p∈Pj
cjpζjp s.t. ajk ≤
∑
p∈Pj
ζjpB
p
jk, ∀k ∈ K, (12)
where ζjp ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to select plan p ∈ Pj .
We denote the min-cost planning solution J indj (aj), where
aj = (ajk : k ∈ K).
When the entities collaborate they select their production
and servicing policies in an incentive-compatible fashion that
also ensures sustainability of the economy. In order to sat-
isfy the IC requirement we leverage the Nash bargaining
solution (NBS) [9] which possesses the important properties
of axiomatic fairness and Pareto efficiency (see [17] for a
discussion), and hence is self-enforcing in the presence of
strategic entities. The solution of following optimization prob-
lem (OptN ) describes the NBS solution when the resources
and demands are known; it will serve as a benchmark for
assessing the performance of our dynamic policy in the sequel:
max
{ρkji},{ζjp}
H = ΠNj=1
(
J indj (aj)−
∑
p∈Pj
cjpζjp
)
(13)
s.t.
aik + 1 ≤
∑
j∈Ni
ρkji
∑
p∈Pj
ζjpB
p
jk, ∀ i ∈ N , k ∈ K , (14)∑
i∈Nj
ρkji ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ N , k ∈ K , (15)∑
p∈Pj
cjpζjp + 2 ≤ J indj (aj), ∀ j ∈ N , (16)∑
p∈Pj
ζjp ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ N , (17)
ρkji, ζjp ∈ [0, 1], ∀ i, j ∈ N , k ∈ K . (18)
ρkji is the probability that j will serve the demands of i for
commodity k; and ζjp the probability she will select plan p. We
use constants 1, 2 > 0 to avoid limiting cases. This problem
admits a solution as we assume zero cooperating costs (e.g.,
no need for additional infrastructure). We denote with ΛP,BK
the closure of set of demand rates that can be served under
the NBS (solution of PS) with bounded costs. In the case cjp
parameters are constant and finite, this region coincides with
ΛPK. It is easy to show (similarly to Lemma 1 and 2) that the
policies stemming from (OptN ) are necessary, sufficient and
optimal for the incentive-compatible and sustainable operation
of the economy; and we denote H∗N (aK) the solution of
(OptN ).
Our goal is to design a dynamic policy that asymptotically
approaches arbitrary close to the optimal planning and servic-
ing solution. Algorithm 3 describes the dynamic policy. First,
note that we introduce an auxiliary variable Yj(t), for each EE
j, representing the evolution of a virtual queue [16] which,
when stable, ensures the following constraint:
lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
τ
E{
∑
p∈Pj
cjpZjp(τ)} ≤ lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
τ
E{J indj,τ },
(19)
where J indj,τ is the cost every EE j would incur in each period
if she was serving only her own needs. This quantity is not
known in advance, but can be computed by the entity in
every period after observing the pending and newly generated
demands. This means that each EE has to run an algorithm
for solving problem (Optindj ), e.g., using a threshold-based
decision policy (see [1] for examples), and use the calculated
value in Algorithm 3 where J indj,t is the respective running
average. The virtual queue evolves in successive periods:
Yj((n+1)T ) = [Yj(nT )−J indj,nT ]++
∑
p∈Pj
cjpZjp(nT ) . (20)
As before, each producer finds the most demanding commod-
ity for each of her neighbors (line 5) and then selects the plan
that maximize the expression (21): namely, the plan is selected
so as to maximize the offered service (last term), and minimize
the cost of production (second term), while balancing the
cost under cooperation with the cost the EE would incur if
operating independently. Next, each EE allocates the service,
in each small slot, based on the accumulated demands of her
neighbors (lines 8-12), for each commodity, and informs her
neighbors about the updated pending demands (lines 13-17).
At the end of the period it updates the virtual queue (line 20)
in order to ensure (asymptotically) that the cooperation cost
will be bounded by the independent cost.
The next theorem characterizes the algorithm’s performance
in terms of cost and average backlog demands.
Theorem 3: Suppose an economy has a sustainability and
IC region ΛP,BK and demand aK such that aK + 1 ∈ ΛP,BK ;
then under the policy described in Algorith 3 the economy is
sustainable and the cooperation policy is incentive compatible,
with optimality and demand backlogs bounded as follows:
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
∑
i,k
E[Xik(τ)] ≤ C + V Gmax
(aK)
(22)
E{H(t)} ≥ H∗N (aK)−
C
V
(23)
where C = TKNA2max + TK
∑
i
(
dini B
2
max + 2(c
max
ip )
2
)
;
Gmax is the maximum value of eq. (13), i.e., the product of
the highest cost values cmaxip of all entities.
Interestingly, with Algorithm 3 that is amenable to dis-
tributed execution, the economic entities achieve a perfor-
mance that is arbitrary close to the objective of OptN , while
Algorithm 3: Policies for costly production plans
1 t = nT, n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}; % Time periods.
2 % Each producer selects her production plan:
3 for j = 1 : N do
4 % Find highest commodity k∗ demand ∀i ∈ Nj .
5 Set Xˆik∗(t) = Xik∗(t); else Xˆik(t) = 0
6 Set Zjp∗(t) = 1 for p∗ that maximizes:
V
(
J indj,t −
∑
p∈Pj
cjpZjp(t)
)−
2
∑
p∈Pj
Zjp
(
Yj(t)cjp − T
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈Nj
Xˆik(t)B
p
jk
)
(21)
end
7 % Each producer allocates her resources in each slot τ :
8 for τ = t : t+ T − 1 do
9 for j = 1 : N do
10 for k = 1 : K do
11 Find i∗ = argmaxi∈Nj Xik(τ)B
p∗
jk .
12 Set Ikji∗(τ) = 1.
end
end
13 % Each consumer updates its demands:
14 for i = 1 : N do
15 for k = 1 : K do
16 Xik(τ) = [Xik(τ − 1)−Mik(τ)]+ +Aik(τ).
17 Send Xik(τ) to every j ∈ Ni.
end
end
end
18 for j = 1 : N do
19 % Each consumer updates its cost queue:
20 Yj(t) = [Yj(t)− J indj,t (t)]+ +
∑
p∈Pj cjpZjp(t).
end
the average number of pending demands is bounded. There-
fore, the EEs ensure the sustainability of the economy and
enforce an 0-NBS solution, where 0 = C/V . The balance
between fairness (or incentive compatibility) and backlog can
be determined by proper selection of V . Also, it is interesting
to note that our policy uses the benchmark independent
performance which does not have to be known in advance,
but it suffices to use its running average (which eventually
will converge in the expected value).
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The problem of cooperation lies at the core of our social
and economic life, and has been excessively studied with
a recent focus on the impact of the network graph on the
bargaining power of each entity [12] or the cooperation out-
come [6]. Similarly, from an engineering point of view, there
is an interesting literature proposing cooperation models and
analyzing their equilibriums, e.g., for decentralized sharing
of wireless services [13] or infrastructure sharing [15]. Two
important and particularly challenging aspects that remain to
be understood are (i) the dynamics of cooperation, namely
how such equilibriums can be achieved in an on-line fashion;
and (ii) the impact of network or graph constraints on the
performance of such cooperative schemes.
Motivated by these observations, our work proposes a
Lyapunov-based optimization approach for designing coop-
eration policies that achieve asymptotically an efficient and
incentive compatible equilibrium. Importantly, this solution
handles well information uncertainties as it does not presume
the existence of prior information about the needs of the enti-
ties, nor the benefits that their collaboration can achieve. The
advantages of our approach come at the expense of asymptotic
optimality which, moreover, in the case of costly production
plans achieves a near-optimal outcome - and hence close to
the bargaining equilibrium. Another important point here is
the time-scale separation we considered, where we followed
an analysis similar to [2], [3]. The impact on performance can
be directly seen at the respective demand bounds, and this
calls for further research in order to improve that result.
The problem of exchanging a single commodity in a static
environment was studied in our previous work [14], where
the existence of competitive and coalitional equilibriums was
proved. From a different perspective, the benefits of cooper-
ation and resource pooling in servicing systems have been
studied in operations research problems. Often the question
there is how the induced cost will be split among the entities,
e.g., see [7], while more recent studies [11] argue that pooling
might even reduce the overall performance under some as-
sumptions about the dependence of the servicing costs on the
total load. Unlike our approach, these important works focus
on static systems with known demands and capacities. Besides,
we consider the selection of production plans and multiple
commodities. This is a particularly important aspect as it
reveals that diversity in production is particularly beneficial
for cooperative systems, an argument that is both intuitive and
experimentally validated in macroscopic scale [4].
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: The necessity of conditions (6) is
straightforward. For the sufficiency part, we need to show
that whenever these conditions are satisfied, we can find a
randomized policy that supports a. Let ρ = (ρji : (j, i) ∈ E)
denote the randomized policy where ρji ≥ 0 is the probability
producer j will serve consumer i. It is then:∑
i∈Q
(ai+) ≤
∑
j∈NQ
ρjibj , ∀Q ⊆ N ,
∑
i∈Nj
ρji ≤ 1, ∀ i, j ∈ N
Finding a randomized policy that satisfies the above con-
straints, and for the minimum possible value of  is a linear
program. Moreover, for the specific example here, we can
show the existence of the randomized policy through construc-
tion.
In particular, we construct a network and employ the max-
flow/min-cut theorem. The graph has a source and sink node
S and D. From the S we have i = 1, . . . , N links, with
capacity a1, a2, . . . , aN , respectively, connecting it with the
2nd-layer nodes. Each of the latter nodes is connected to
a subset of N nodes at the 3rd layer (having capacity ai,
respectively), based on the links E in the original graph G.
Finally, the 3rd-layer nodes are connected to the D with links
of capacity b1, b2, . . . , bN . The minimum cut of this graph is
comprised of the outgoing edges of node S, with total capacity
1
2
3
α1
α2
α3
b1 
ρ12
1
2
3
S
b2 
b3 
D
ρ11
ρ31
α1
α1
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Fig. 4. The max-flow diagram for the economy of Fig. 1.
∑N
i=1 ai. Hence, the maximum network flow can support the
given vector a. In particular, let fij denote the flow over link
(i, j), and f1, f2, . . . , fN the flows emanating from S, under a
max-flow solution. Since the graph satisfies (6) the max-flow
is supportable, and the routing policy for each link can be
simply defined as the ratio fij/ai. The max-flow solution can
be found in polynomial time. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: We use the Lyapunov function,
L(X(t)) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
(
Xi(t)
)2
and following the analysis in [1] we define the Lyapunov drift
∆
(
L(X(t))
)
for which it holds:
∆
(
L(X(t))
)
= E{L(X(t+ 1))− L(X(t))|X(t)} ≤
N∑
i=1
A2max +M
2
i,max
2
+
N∑
i=1
aiXi(t)− E{
N∑
i=1
Xi(t)Mi(t)|X(t)} ,
where Mi,max is the maximum service node i can receive,
namely Mi,max = dini Bmax, where d
in
i is the in-degree of i.
Hence, selecting in each slot the servicing policy that
maximizes the last term, ensures a negative Lyapunov drift
which in turn (see Lemma 4.1 [1]) ensures strong stability
and a long-term expected backlog:
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
N∑
i=1
E[Xi(τ)] ≤ NA
2
max +
∑N
i=1 d
in
i B
2
max
2(a)
and hence that the cooperative network is sustainable.
Let us now discuss why this policy can be devised in a
distributed fashion. This boils down to whether quantity:
N∑
i=1
Xi(t)
∑
j∈Ni
Iji(t)Bj(t) , (24)
can be maximized in each slot t distributively by the nodes.
In each slot t, every producer j can observe her available
resources Bj(t) and the demands of her connected consumers
Xi(t), i ∈ Nj , and serve the one with the largest backlog.
Since the allocation decisions of the producers are indepen-
dent, this will lead to serving the consumers with the largest
pending requests in each time instance. Hence, the proposed
policy will asymptotically achieve the goal of negative drift.
Clearly, there will likely be slots where excessive resource will
be allocated to a certain consumer, e.g., when a producer has
more available resources than those needed, or when two or
more producers will concurrently serve the same consumer.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: It is easy to show both the necessity and
the sufficiency of conditions in the Lemma. For the sufficiency
part, we need to show that whenever these conditions are
satisfied, we can find a randomized policy that supports
the admissible rate vector aK. This can be proved using
Caratheodory’s theorem and observing that we can construct
a state-independent stochastic planning and service allocation
policy that implements ΠK. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: We use again a quadratic Lyapunov
function and work with the T -slot drift:
∆T (t) = E{L
(
XK(t+ T )
)− L(XK(t))|XK(t)} , (25)
where we observe the evolution of demands at each consumer
for every commodity over T slots beyond time instance t.
Using the following result (Lemma 4.3 [1]):
V ≤ max[U −µ, 0]+A⇒ V 2 ≤ U2 +µ2 +A2−2U(µ−A),
and summing over all slots τ within period T , we find that:
Xik(t+ T − 1)2 −Xik(t)2 ≤
t+T−1∑
τ=t
M2ik(τ) +
t+T−1∑
τ=t
A2ik(τ)
− 2
t+T−1∑
τ=t
Xik(τ)[Mik(τ)−Aik(τ)].
Hence, the drift is bounded as follows
∆T (t) ≤ T
∑
i,k
A2max + T
∑
i,k
M2ik,max
− 2E{
∑
i,k
t+T∑
τ=t
Xik(τ)[Mik(τ)−Aik(τ)]|XK(t)} (26)
where Mik,max is the maximum amount of resources of type
k that can be allocated to consumer i in each slot, and can be
written
Mik,max = d
in
i Bmax, or, Mik,max =
∑
j∈Ni
max
p
{Bpjk} .
(27)
Note that the first two terms in (26) are upper bounded, and
that the expression includes the values of matrix XK(τ), τ =
t+1, ...t+T which, clearly, are not available at the beginning
of the period, i.e., t = T . Following the approach in [2], [3]
we use for the entire period the values of pending demands at
t, and hence we get:
∆T (t) ≤ T
∑
i,k
A2max + T
∑
i,k
M2ik,max
+ 2T
∑
i,k
Xik(t)aik − 2E{
∑
i,k
Xik(t)
t+T∑
τ=t
Mik(τ)|XK(t)} ,
and the latter term can be further written as:
E{
∑
i,k
Xik(t)
∑
j∈Ni
t+T−1∑
τ=t
Ikji(τ)
∑
p∈Pj
Zjp(t)B
p
jk|XK(t)} .
(28)
The goal of our policy is to maximize this quantity opportunis-
tically, where production planning decisions are made every
period t = nT, n = 0, 1, . . ., and service allocation every slot
t = nT + τ . Since the demand generation rates are within the
sustainability region, it is easy to see that the result follows
(see Lemma 4.1 in [1]). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: There are two different queues evolving
as follows:
Xik(t+ 1) = [Xik(t)−Mik(t)]+ +Aik(t), ∀ (i, k) (29)
Yi(t+ 1) = [Yi(t)− J indi,t ]+ +
∑
p∈Pi
cipZip(t, ∀ i . (30)
We define the following Lyapunov function:
L(Y ,X) =
1
2
∑
i,k
X2ik +
1
2
∑
i
Y 2i . (31)
We consider the T-slot Lyapunov drift. Let us first observe
that the evolution of the respective queues, can be bounded as
follows:
Xik(t+ T − 1)2 −Xik(t)2 ≤
t+T−1∑
τ=t
M2ik(τ)+
t+T−1∑
τ=t
A2ik(τ)− 2
t+T−1∑
τ=t
Xik(τ)[Mik(τ)−Aik(τ)] (32)
and
Yi(t+ T − 1)2 − Yi(t)2 ≤
(
J indi,t
)2
+( ∑
p∈Pi
cipZip(t)
)2 − 2Yi(t)[J indi,t −∑
p∈Pi
cipZip(t)] . (33)
If we add the above inequalities and rearrange terms, we get
for the right hand side:
≤ Bik + 2
t+T−1∑
τ=t
Xik(τ)Aik − 2Yi(t)J indi,t
− 2
t+T−1∑
τ=t
Xik(τ)Mik(τ) + 2Yi(t)
∑
p∈Pi
cipZip(t) , (34)
where the constant Bik is:
Bik = T (Mik,max)
2 + T (Amax)
2 + (J indi,max)
2 + (cip,max)
2 .
We proceed by relaxing the time-slot dependency on Xik and
on service allocation decisions Ikji as in [2], [3]. In practice,
this means we consider the suboptimal case where we decide
these policies with the information we have at the beginning
of the period. Clearly, the performance of the Algorithms is
superior (and hence stable) as they adapt on a per-slot basis.
Therefore, we get:
Yi(t+ T − 1)2 +Xik(t+ T − 1)2 − Yi(t)2 −Xik(t)2 ≤
Bik + 2TXik(t)Aik(t)− 2Yi(t)J indi,t
− 2TXik(t)Mik(t) + 2Yi(t)
∑
p∈Pi
cipZip(t) . (35)
Hence, the T-slot Lyapunov drift ∆T (t) is defined as:
E{L(X(t+ T ),Y (t+ T ))− L(X(t),Y (t))|(X(t),Y (t))}
Therefore, if we add also the objective of maximizing the
bargaining product, we get the following drift-plus-penalty
expression:
∆T (t)− V E{ΠNi=1
(
J indi,t −
∑
p∈Pi
cipZip(t)
)|X(t),Y (t)} ≤
B + 2TE{
∑
i,k
Xik(t)Aik(t)|X(t),Y (t)}
− 2E{
∑
i
Yi(t)J
ind
i,t |X(t),Y (t)}
− 2TE{
∑
i,k
Xik(t)Mik(t)||X(t),Y (t)}
+ 2E{
∑
i
Yi(t)
∑
p
cipZip(t)|X(t),Y (t)}
− V E{ΠNi=1
(
J indi,t −
∑
p∈Pi
cipZip(t)
)|X(t),Y (t)} . (36)
It is clear from the above, following the analysis in [1] (see
Theorem 5.8) that our algorithm maximizes opportunistically
the drift in each slot. Hence, the above quantity can be
bounded by the respective solution of the static problem
(OptN ).
Some other important points for this theorem are the follow-
ing. The impact of fixing the values of Xik(t) and Mik(t) in
the beginning of the time period is not explicitly studied due
to lack of space, but can be analyzed as in [2], [3]. However,
it is proved that since the suboptimal policy (of deciding on a
per period basis) stabilizes the system, the policy that updates
decisions per slot also makes the economy sustainable, and
possibly achieves a closer to optimal point.
Another interesting point is that each entity has to run in
parallel a threshold-based algorithm in order to assess the cost
J indi,τ that would incur, had she operated in an independent
mode. Then, using this quantity, it updates the running aver-
age:
J indi,t =
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
J indi,τ , (37)
and plugs it in Algorithm 3. It is easy to see that, due to
our assumptions about the demand generation processes, after
some iterations this quantity will converge to the steady-state
and a constant value. Finally, the Nash bargaining objective
is a product of the terms for each entity. Since the decisions
and cost functions of the EEs are decoupled, this product can
be maximized in a decentralized fashion. Alternatively, one
can employ the equivalent logarithmic formulation of the NBS
introduced in [17]. Q.E.D.
